

“(e) BORROWER LIABILITY FOR FEES.—No borrower shall be liable for any fees which are not disclosed on an early settlement statement, except that the borrower is liable for such fees if—

“(1) the total amount charged for fees imposed by independent third parties is—

“(A) not more than 10 percent greater than that stated in the early settlement statement; or

“(B) greater than that allowed under subparagraph (A) because bona fide and reasonable expenses were incurred by such third parties for unanticipated inspection, appraisal, survey, or flood certification of the home which was the subject of such loan;

“(2) the mortgage originator provides a reasonable explanation of the circumstances surrounding the settlement of the loan of the borrower which were different than anticipated by the mortgage originator when the statement was provided; and

“(3) the mortgage originator does not engage in a pattern or practice of providing early settlement statements which disclose individual fees of independent third parties in different amounts than actually charged at settlement.

“(f) LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Whoever fails to comply with any provision of this section shall be liable to the borrower for an amount equal to the sum of—

“(A) any actual damages to the borrower as a result of the failure; and

“(B) \$5,000 for each such instance of non-compliance.

“(2) COURT COSTS.—In addition to any amount under paragraph (1), in the case of any successful action brought by a borrower under this subsection, such borrower shall be reimbursed for the costs of the action, together with any attorneys fees incurred in connection with such action as the court may determine to be reasonable under the circumstances.

“(g) DEFINITION.—As used in this section, the term ‘mortgage originator’—

“(1) means any person who, for direct or indirect compensation or gain, or in the expectation of direct or indirect compensation or gain—

“(A) takes a residential mortgage loan application; or

“(B) assists a consumer in obtaining or applying to obtain a residential mortgage loan; and

“(2) includes any person who makes loans directly or brokers loans for others.”.

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 5(c) of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (12 U.S.C. 2604(c)) is hereby repealed.

## SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS

### SENATE RESOLUTION 375—AMENDING SENATE RESOLUTION 400, 94TH CONGRESS, AND SENATE RESOLUTION 445, 108TH CONGRESS, TO IMPROVE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES, TO PROVIDE A STRONG, STABLE, AND CAPABLE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE STRUCTURE TO PROVIDE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY APPROPRIATE OVERSIGHT, SUPPORT, AND LEADERSHIP, AND TO IMPLEMENT A KEY RECOMMENDATION OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

Mr. BURR (for himself, Mr. BAYH, Mr. SUNUNU, Ms. SNOWE, Mr. FEINGOLD, Mr. MCCAIN, and Mr. HAGEL) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration:

S. RES. 375

Whereas the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (referred to in this Resolution as the “9/11 Commission”) conducted a lengthy review of the facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, including those relating to the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, and the role of congressional oversight and resource allocation;

Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission found that congressional oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States is dysfunctional;

Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further found that under the rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives in effect at the time the report was completed, the committees of Congress charged with oversight of the intelligence activities lacked the power, influence, and sustained capability to meet the daunting challenges faced by the intelligence community of the United States;

Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further found that as long as such oversight is governed by such rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the people of the United States will not get the security they want and need;

Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further found that a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure is needed to give the intelligence community of the United States appropriate oversight, support, and leadership;

Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further found that the reforms recommended by the 9/11 Commission in its final report will not succeed if congressional oversight of the intelligence community in the United States is not changed;

Whereas the 9/11 Commission recommended structural changes to Congress to improve the oversight of intelligence activities;

Whereas the 9/11 Commission recommended that the authorizing authorities and appropriating authorities with respect to intelligence activities in each house of Congress be combined into a single committee in each house of Congress;

Whereas Congress has enacted some of the recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission and is considering implementing addi-

tional recommendations of the 9/11 Commission; and

Whereas the Senate adopted Senate Resolution 445 in the 108th Congress to address some of the intelligence oversight recommendations of the 9/11 Commission by abolishing term limits for the members of the Select Committee on Intelligence, clarifying jurisdiction for intelligence-related nominations, and streamlining procedures for the referral of intelligence-related legislation, but other aspects of the 9/11 Commission recommendations regarding intelligence oversight have not been implemented: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved,*

#### SECTION 1. PURPOSES.

The purposes of this resolution are—

(1) to improve congressional oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States;

(2) to provide a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure to provide the intelligence community appropriate oversight, support, and leadership;

(3) to implement a key recommendation of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the “9/11 Commission”) that structural changes be made to Congress to improve the oversight of intelligence activities; and

(4) to provide vigilant legislative oversight over the intelligence activities of the United States to assure that such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

#### SEC. 2. INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT.

(a) AUTHORITY OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE.—Paragraph (5) of section 3(a) of Senate Resolution 400, 94th Congress, agreed to May 19, 1976, is amended in that matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking the comma following “authorizations for appropriations” and inserting “and appropriations.”.

(b) ABOLISHMENT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE.—Senate Resolution 445, 108th Congress, agreed to October 9, 2004, is amended by striking section 402.

### SENATE RESOLUTION 376—PROVIDING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE SHOULD DECLARE A COMMERCIAL FISHERY FAILURE FOR THE GROUND FISH FISHERY FOR MASSACHUSETTS, MAINE, NEW HAMPSHIRE, AND RHODE ISLAND AND IMMEDIATELY PROPOSE REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT SECTION 312(a) OF THE MAGNUSON-STEVENS FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT

Mr. KERRY (for himself, Mr. KENNEDY, Ms. SNOWE, Mr. GREGG, Mr. SUNUNU, Mr. REED, and Ms. COLLINS) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:

S. RES. 376

Whereas the Secretary of Commerce may provide fishery disaster assistance under section 312(a) of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C. 1861a(a)) if the Secretary determines that there is a commercial fishery failure due to a fishery resource disaster as a result of natural causes, man-made causes beyond the control of fishery managers to mitigate through conservation and management measures, including regulatory restrictions